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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
a number of acts which they maintained were part performance
of an alleged oral contract, sufficient to render the statute of frauds
inoperative. In return for the plaintiffs' landscaping the area
adjacent to their and defendants' buildings and developing a gar-
den project, defendants allegedly were to grant plaintiffs a per-
petual easement. The court cited Burns v. McCormick," contain-
ing the well-known opinion of Cardozo, which eloquently reaffirmed
the general rule: "There must be performance 'unequivocably
referable' to the agreement. . . 'An act which admits of explana-
tion without reference to the alleged oral contract or a contract of
the same general nature and purposes is not, in general, admitted
to constitute a part performance.' 12 What is done must itself
supply the key to what is promised. It is not enough that what
is promised may give significance to what is done." 13
The court said it knew of no authority holding that an oral
contract for a perpetual easement has been sufficiently performed
to authorize a decree of specific performance where the applicant
did not have possession, and where no improvements were made,
as was the case here. Notwithstanding, the court then referred
to the specific acts of the plaintiffs and said these acts did not
meet the above test. The plaintiffs' purchase of two adjoining
buildings from third persons, the gaining of possession of eight
apartments in one of them, the hiring of an architect to draw
plans for the garden project, consultation with their attorneys
relative to the preparation of formal grants, and even the regis-
tering of the trade name "Carnegie Gardens," the court said
could be interpreted as part performance of the alleged contract,
but "it is by no means the only reasonable explanation of those
acts and that is the test which must be satisfied."' 4
Collateral Attack
In Swindler v. Knocklong Corp.,5 defendant had acquired
title to land at a tax sale and was awarded judgment in a parti-
tion action he then brought against plaintiffs. Here, the plain-
tiffs, successors of the heirs of the record owner, brought this
action under Real Property Law, § 500, et seq., to set aside the
service in the latter action. Plaintiffs founded their claim on the
ground that service by publication in the partition action was
void since it was based on an affidavit that the heirs of the record
owner could not be found. Defendant's search only went as far
as the date of his filing lis pendens in that action. A more com-
11. 233 N. Y. 230, 135 N. E. 273 (1922).
12. Wooley v. Stewart, 222 N. Y. 347, 351, 118 N. E. 847, 848 (1918).
13. Burns v. McCormick, supra, at 232, 135 N. E. at 273.
14. 113 N. E. 2d at 421.
15. 305 N. Y. 527, 114 N. E. 2d 25 (1953).
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plete search of the record would have revealed a deed from these
heirs which was recorded eight days after the filing of the lis
pendens.
The court admitted that technically the affidavit of defendant
was incomplete or even possibly misleading, but took judicial
notice that the filing of a ]is pendens in such an action is the cut-
off point, and any transaction thereafter affecting title is subject
to the ]is pendens. Therefore, the court held that the application
for the order of service by publication was justified. Citing Valz
v. S1heephead Bay Bungalow Corp.,16 the court pointed out that in
such a collateral attack as the present one, the question is whether
the prior judgment was so far invalid as to amount to a denial of
due process. Since the lower courts decided in favor of the valid-
ity of the service in the previous action, the Court of Appeals
said it could not hold, as a matter of law, that the affidavits on
which the publication order was obtained were so fraudulent as
to make the order itself, and the subsequent service and judgment,
nullities. The plaintiffs, in this collateral attack, did not meet
their heavy burden of proving clearly there was actual, and not
mere constructive, fraud.17
Landlord-Tenant
Ordinarily where a lessee has the right to renew his lease
provided he gives notice, the giving of notice is a condition prec-
edent which must be complied with within the stipulated time. 8
However, when there is a showing of mistake or surprise or other
similar excusable fault, equity may relieve against the forfeiture
of a valuable lease. 9  In Jones v. Cianferante,20 the tenant had
intended to accomplish a renewal, but his notice to the landlord
was thirteen days after the time ambiguously specified in the lease.
The court found that this failure to notify within the designated
time was the result of an honest mistake that caused no damage
to the landlord, and that to evict the tenant would cause him great
hardship because of his business investment, etc. Relying upon
these equitable principles, the court affirmed the dismissal of the
landlord's action.2'
16. 249 N. Y. 122, 163 N. E. 124 (1928).
17. Ward v. Town of Southfield, 102 N. Y. 287, 293, 6 N. E. 660, 661 (1886).
18. Doepfner v. Bowers, 55 Misc. 561, 106 N. Y. Supp. 932 (Sup. Ct. 1907);
Ocumpaugh v. Engel, 121 App. Div. 9, 105 N. Y. Supp. 510 (4th Dep't 1907) ; Fidelity
& Columbia Trust Co. v. Levin, 128 Misc. 838, 221 N. Y. Supp. 269 (Sup. Ct 1927),
aff'd, 221 App. Div. 786, 223 N. Y. Supp. 866, aff'd, 248 N. Y. 551, 162 N. E. 521 (1928).
19. N. Y. Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Rector of St. George's Church, 64 How. Prac.
511 (1883); Matter of Topp, 81 N. Y. S. 2d 344 (Sup. Ct 1948).
20. 305 N. Y. 135, 111 N. E. 2d 419 (1953).
21. 280 App. Div. 856, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 703 (3d Dep't 1952).
